The Right to Organize at Work Deserves Constitutional Protection

On Labor Day, alongside stories about parades and final trips to the beach, we can expect to read the usual depressing statistics about the decline of labor unions in the United States. The problem with this coverage isn’t the facts, which are undeniable — it’s the tone of inevitability.

Today, less than 11 percent of workers, including just 7 percent in the private sector, are members of a union — a dramatic drop from the 1950s, when more than one-third of the workforce was unionized. The recent loss by the United Auto Workers at a Mississippi Nissan factory, where workers voted by a three-to-one ratio against union representation, is just the latest in a long string of defeats for the labor movement.

And this decline has a real effect on families’ financial security: Researchers have shown that nearly half of the decline in middle-class incomes is due to the shrinking rates of unionization.

Few articles probe deeply into the cause of the decline, but here’s a hint: It isn’t because unions no longer make sense in the modern economy, nor is it about American workers’ supposed skepticism toward unions (especially in the South). And it’s not more evidence that the white working class stubbornly insists on voting against its own interests.

Rather, the decline of unions is a direct result of our nation’s badly broken labor laws — specifically, the ways in which those laws and court decisions fail to acknowledge, much less protect, the constitutional rights of workers.

American courts have never been kind to labor. From the beginning of our nation’s history well into the 20th century, union organizing efforts were treated by conservative jurists as criminal conspiracies and interferences with employers’ sacrosanct contract rights. Unions spent the 19th and early 20th centuries decrying “judge-made law” and seeking, essentially, to get the government and courts out of labor disputes.

This approach did notch a few victories. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 prevented the federal courts from issuing injunctions against union picket lines (which were frequently enforced at bayonet point). Many states passed similar laws to keep their courts and local police out of the fray.

But the modern labor era began in many ways in 1935, with the National Labor Relations Act, which made it the official policy of the United States to encourage collective bargaining. The act established a federal agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which would certify unions and punish employers that refused to deal with them. While well intended, passage of the NLRA in the form it took has had many unintended, and some extremely detrimental, consequences for organized labor.

A failure to ground labor laws in the Bill of Rights

The framers of the legislation, who at the time were leery of a conservative Supreme Court, made the pragmatic decision to root the law’s authority in the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the right “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” This was the subject of no small debate at the time.

Many advocates believed that labor’s rights should be based on First Amendment rights to free speech and free assembly; others thought that the Fifth Amendment right to “due process” — interpreted as a broad protection of citizens’ rights — made sense. Leaders of the American Federation of Labor had been arguing for a half-century that the 13th Amendment, which prohibited both slavery and, crucially, “involuntary servitude,” was the appropriate constitutional basis for labor rights. But the act’s framers were convinced that the Lochner-era Court that made laissez faire economics a virtual state religion would never go for more lofty human rights justifications.

Practically speaking, the court was motivated to accept the NLRA more by the wave of sit-down strikes roiling the country in 1937 than by legal theories. But conceiving of unionization as a matter of business regulation led to a very narrow interpretation of the act. Before the end of World War II, the court took away legal protections for sit-down strikers, denied striking workers the right to return to his job, and granted employers a First Amendment right to run vicious union-busting campaigns.

Much of this anti-union thrust was endorsed and enhanced by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, passed by a Republican Congress over President Truman’s veto. The law declared it illegal for union members to boycott or picket a “secondary” employer — that is, a company that they do not work directly for, but who has significant or even essential business dealings with their employer.

Most people think of the Taft-Hartley Act for its “right-to-work” provisions. The Act permitted states to allow workers to decline to join a union, or pay fees, even if they benefitted from union-negotiated contracts.

But it’s the prohibition against solidarity activism, the heart and soul of the labor movement, that’s been most devastating. A cable provider that gets into a fight with a television channel over revenue sharing can black that channel out. But if the workers at your local unionized grocery store want to keep Oreo cookies created at a scab factory off the shelves, they face steep fines, effectively banning the practice.

Restrictions on labor accelerated in 1949, when 10 unionized technicians at the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company, in Charlotte, North Carolina, were fired for distributing handbills criticizing their employer. Workers quickly filed a complaint with the NLRB arguing that they were participating in a legally protected activity, but the NLRB ruled that the technicians’ actions were not protected because they were not explicitly connected to the union contract campaign — they involved more general complaints.

Courts recognized “disloyalty” as lawful grounds for firing a worker

Upon appeal, the US Supreme Court issued Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, one of its most aggressively anti-labor decisions. The majority wrote, among other things: “There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer.”

Interpretation of the Jefferson Standard decision has led to decades of harsh and contradictory court decisions that chill the rights of workers to speak out. This past July, the Eighth Circuit ruled that six workers at a Jimmy Johns sandwich shop could be fired because they circulated memes suggesting that customers might be eating food made by sick workers. They were protesting the franchise owner’s refusal to provide paid sick days (ill workers also had find their own replacements).

The “poster attack” was “so disloyal” that it was not protected under the law, the court found. Unsurprisingly, the judges had little to say about the employer’s reciprocal responsibility to be loyal enough to its workers to let them take a day off when they get sick.

And consider the recent vote at the Mississippi Nissan plant, in which efforts to form a union were turned back. In order to determine whether workers had a legal right to form a union, the NLRB held an election with rules set forth by Congress and the courts. Among them was the requirement that only one side — the party that opposes unionization — can force employees to attend mandatory presentations of their arguments as a condition of employment. The union, according to the federal government, has no equivalent right of access or response.

Employers’ speech to captive audiences of employees is protected

As expected, managers at Nissan forced employees to attend multiple one-on-one and small group “captive audience” meetings, in which they threatened that the plant could be relocated, or shuttered, if workers voted for a union. That is nothing new. Across the country, employers make fake “economic predictions” to threaten workers’ jobs in two-thirds of all union elections, according to Cornell professor Kate Bronfenbrenner.

But restrictions on workers’ speech don’t end at rigged elections; the government also censors what unions can do at the bargaining table. Federal law requires employers to negotiate “in good faith,” but only on a tightly circumscribed set of issues — basically just wages, hours and some working conditions. A decision to relocate a factory, as Nissan managers threatened, is not an issue unions can negotiate.

This is what makes threats of plant closures such effective anti-union tactics. Workers want unions that have the ability to veto or amend management’s decisions to downsize, subcontract, automate or shift work overseas. But in the American system, unlike in much of Europe, such matters are the prerogative of management alone. When the law restricts unions from being what workers want them to be, of course there are going to be low levels of union representation.

Simply put, employees are hampered by rules that would never be applied to corporations, or to any other form of political activism. That the government can dictate to workers what they can or cannot write on a flyer, where and how they can march, and what they can and cannot boycott, is not just unfair — it ought to be illegal.

In March 2016, the Supreme Court considered the issue of speech in bargaining in Friedrichs v. CTA, a case that deadlocked 4-4 (without Justice Scalia’s vote); in that case, conservatives argued that public-sector unions violate workers’ speech rights when they collect mandatory union fees. The goal was to bankrupt the last of the big unions. The parties are suing for a do-over in the pending Janus v. AFSCME.

Union advocates should wrest the free-speech issue from conservatives, because we have the far better case: Every interaction between the government and a union is a matter of political speech. Unions and their allies should challenge unequal restrictions on free speech and assembly as the violations of workers’ constitutional rights that they are.

As economists scratch their heads this Labor Day about why the longest economic expansion on record is not translating to increases in most Americans’ standard of living, let’s take a good, hard look at precisely how the power of unions has been curbed. Just as laws permitting collective bargaining helped build the American middle class, a vigorous First Amendment defense of workers’ constitutional rights can help rebuild it today.

[This post originally appeared at Vox.]

The Cost, not the Cure

Chris Brooks has an excellent piece in the new issue of New Labor Forum that grapples with the question of whether unions should cede exclusive representation if the country goes “right-to-work.” As the title of his article, “The Cure Worse than the Disease: Expelling Freeloaders in an Open-Shop State,” suggests, he’s against it:

Ceding exclusive representation to “kick out the scabs,” as Richman would have it, might be okay for a high-functioning local with high union density, but a union with 60 percent membership is likely to create an entrenched, adversarial minority. A union representing Geoghegan’s “40 percent, or 30, or fewer” can easily succumb to being nothing more than a marginal minority. So long as unions are treated as third-party vendors of services, as Fisk and Sachs describe them, then it will be easy for yellow unions to provide the same insurance, professional development, and discounted movie tickets at a lower cost.

Members-only unionism might be a solution to the free-rider problem that unions face in an open-shop environment, but it is not a solution for the internal divisions between workers that unions must overcome if the labor movement is to grow. The labor movement is at its strongest when it is capable of fighting for all workers as a class, living up to the old refrain “an injury to one is an injury to all.” By advocating for members- only unionism, labor activists run the risk of unwittingly weakening the labor movement by narrowing the scope of union solidarity to a smaller grouping of dues-paying members and setting the stage for yellow unions to pit workers against one another and create further divisions. If the source of a union’s power is the ability of workers to take collective action on the job, then the Tennessee experience high- lights the struggles that confront an increasingly divided and weakened labor movement.

Brooks draws on his own dispiriting experience with multiple (right-wing, boss-friendly) competing unions in the school systems in Tennessee, and engages with some of my writing on the question. I feel like my thinking on the matter gets a bit lost in translation, but it’s my own fault. I’ve been too cute with the subject, dealing with it in asides that mostly avoid firmly advocating anything at all.

Partly that’s because I think the union shop is worth defending right now. While I’m playing with thoughts of what we should do if we lose it, I don’t want to appear as if I’m rooting for the loss of agency fee and the chaos that should follow it (Even though I tend to agree with Brooks that “The United States is likely to be an entirely open- shop country in the near future.”).

I do think unionists need to study our history and other countries’ labor movements. We should realize that our combination of exclusive representation at the enterprise level, the union shop and the duty of fair representation is historically and globally bizarre and the product of a series of accidents – not a strategically pursued model. It works when all of the pieces are in play. But if you knock anyone of them out, as “right-to-work” destroyers seek to do, then the whole system becomes unworkable. That unworkability is initially and acutely felt by the unions, which makes it incumbent on us to spread the pain and blow the whole system up if the union-busters win a national “right-to-work.”

One day, when I’m not promoting Labor’s Bill of Rights, I’ll deal with this subject at length. I’ve got 10,000 semi-abandoned words just dealing with how the current U.S. labor framework accidentally fell together waiting to be dusted off. In the meantime, I did want to quickly respond to Chris Brooks’ very good piece.

First of all, he’s right that when I write about this, I’m thinking of a high-functioning private sector contract. What I’ve studied most are the unions of the NYC hotel industry in the 1920’s and 30’s who competed for strike leadership every few years and drove the industry so batty that they eventually voluntarily recognized a merged union in 1939 to buy themselves some peace. I don’t think that the public sector in the south is the place to start an experiment like this.

But, I’ve also been very clear that if unions cede exclusive representation that other organizations will step into the space they’ve ceded and that those are likely to be company unions and right-wing outfits at first. My first piece for In These Times was actually on this subject. I was responding to a piece by Moshe Marvit that advocated organizing new “members only” bargaining units to side-step the rigged NLRB election process and win a union for the workers who want them. I thought it’s a fine idea but that we should all be clear that that would inevitably lead to multiple competing unions:

If labor cedes exclusivity, we can expect more independents like ACE to fill the void. We should also expect the Horseshoers and Hod Carriers and the whole cottage industry of corrupt unions that were long ago thrown out of the AFL-CIO for unprincipled raiding to troll around for disgruntled dues payers. And nobody should be surprised if Koch brothers-funded, States Policy Network affiliates like Michigan’s Mackinac Center shop around the legal and member benefits services of new, explicitly anti-union “unions.”

But the hope here is that eventually other real unions rise up to challenge each other for shop floor leadership in terms of who can pick the right issues, the best fights and lead the best protest actions. Here is where my point gets a bit muddled in Brooks’ re-telling:

Shaun Richman imagines a future in which employers bargain multiple contracts with separate unions representing different workers in the same workforce, creating the conditions for union competition and employer “chaos.”

I’ll be clear here: in a model of multiple unions competing in a workplace, the best case scenario is one contract for the unit. More likely is that this is a contract-less labor world where unions demand to bargain over changes in working conditions on a rolling basis. Now, I’m assuming here that the Unfair Labor Practice protections of the National Labor Relations Act remain in place (And that is a fairly major assumption in a right-to-work world where unions lose perhaps half of their membership and power in a few short years). That would mean that employers still have a duty to bargain “in good faith” with a union that demands it, and that an employer cannot discriminatorily apply work rules on the basis of union membership.

So, if one union raises an issue – a wage increase, a work quota reduction, etc. – and wins it, that settlement would have to be applied to all workers in the bargaining unit. And if a different union regards that settlement as a sell-out and continues to agitate and organize around it and somehow wins a better settlement, that would have to replace the old settlement as the new work rule for the entire unit.

In this scenario, I imagine that most unions will still see it as advantageous to seek a signed collective bargaining agreement, and that some employers might view signing one with a strong workplace leader as temporarily advantageous for getting a degree of peace. If they sign a deal, they’ll find ways to not negotiate with other unions during the terms of the agreement while the other unions spend the meantime shitting all over the deal to jockey for workplace leadership in the next round of bargaining.

With me so far? I feel like I’m writing the labor law equivalent of a sci-fi spec script.

Here, I think, is where the potential for chaos comes in to play. Those other unions? The ones that hate the contract and are organizing against it? Does the “no-strike” provision of the contract apply to them? Why? They’re not members of the union that signed it. That union made a promise to keep its own members from striking, with the enforcement mechanism being that any member who is a party to the agreement has signed off on the non-grievability of terminating someone who strikes during the term of the agreement. I think this would be the effective end of “no-strike” agreements, which have been one of the greatest inhibitors to labor militancy in the last half century.

The other major potential gain here is also where I think this experiment is more likely to get carried out: in new organizing. The loss of agency fee really ought to make unions ask themselves why they are losing elections at the NLRB to vie for the obligations of representing all of the workers in a bargaining unit with no promise of compensation for the political costs and the loss of resources. Back to that first In These Times piece:

Charles J. Morris, in his 2005 book The Blue Eagle at Work, reminds us that in its first few years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) used to certify minority unions as the bargaining agent for that union’s members only, and that such a mechanism still exists (although the modern Board has dodged efforts to get a ruling to respond to Morris’ assertion).

The employers’ preference to deal with somewhere between zero and one unions has been enshrined in the legal preference for exclusive representation. As well, the civil rights thrust of the duty of fair representation make going back to members only certifications a steep hill to climb (made steeper still by the current occupant of the White House). But the loss of the union shop is an opening for unions to argue that the trade-offs are unjust and unsustainable and that the law should return to what we needed it to be in 1935: a guarantee that anywhere a group of workers have joined together as a union, the employer must deal with them as a union.

We don’t know where our breakthrough opportunities are going to arise. How we respond to and exploit anti-union legal pushes is within our control and where some potential for good change occurs. We’re not talking about “curing” an unjust “right-to-work” push; we’re talking about how to make the open shop onslaught cost the bosses in ways they never anticipated.

Want to Really Help Workers? Protect their Speech!

When does free speech stop being free? At the entranceway of one’s job, apparently.

That was the implication of a ruling this month from the Eighth Circuit Court, which found that the sandwich conglomerate Jimmy John’s was within its rights to fire six employees for making signs that protested the company’s policy of forcing workers to come to work when ill.

While the decision came as a surprise to many, the logic underlying it—that employees have few, if any, free speech protections on the job—has had devastating impacts on American workers for decades. Indeed, the dramatic drop in union representation is due in part to the fact that our court system regulates employees’ ability to organize by the impact of their organizing on businesses’ bottom line, devoid of any concern for the free speech or civil rights of workers.

Until we ensure that freedom of speech extends to the workplace, workers and the labor movement writ large will continue to suffer defeats at the hands of courts, corporations and legislatures. In short, we need a 21st-century Bill of Rights for Labor.

It’s no secret that laws meant to protect workers’ rights have been under assault for decades, in spite of greater protections and progress for workers in many areas. Unions are hampered by rules that would never be applied to corporations, or to any other form of political activism. Underlying this assault is the decision by the framers of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to ground the Act’s constitutionality in the Commerce Clause, not the Bill of Rights or the Reconstruction amendments.

Just consider how unions get formed. To determine whether employees at a workplace have a legal right to form a union and bargain collectively, the National Labor Relations Board conducts an election to determine whether the workers “want” to form a union. The rules that govern this election, as set forth by Congress and, subsequently, the courts, are that only one side—the party that advocates a “no” vote—can force employees to attend mandatory presentations of their arguments as a condition of employment.

Employers use half of all of these “captive audience” meetings to threaten wage and benefit cuts should they vote to go union, according to researchers at Cornell. In two-thirds of these instances, bosses threaten to go out of business entirely; in one in ten cases, employers actually hire goons to impersonate federal agents and intentionally mislead workers about their rights and collective bargaining. It’s no wonder that anti-union consultants consider exploiting this imbalance of speech to be “management’s most important weapon in a campaign.”

Unions, for their part, have tried to fix this problem legislatively, perhaps most notably through the Employee Free Choice Act a decade ago. That attempt, however, which would have allowed workers to sidestep elections entirely by simply requiring a majority of workers to sign union-affiliation cards, was greeted by a multimillion dollar right-wing assault that extolled the “sanctity of the secret ballot.” The bill, not surprisingly, did not pass.

Given that attempts to reform labor law for the benefit of labor itself have largely failed since the 1935 NLRA passage, unions and their allies need a new strategy. That starts with changing the frame of the debate—returning to rights-based legal strategies and challenging the unequal restrictions on free speech for what they are: unconstitutional.

The rights of working people to unite, protest, boycott unfair businesses, and demand change in all areas of business are fundamentally rooted in the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction amendments. Where labor law restricts these rights, either through statute or judicial fiat, it should be resisted and challenged as such.

Given that attempts to reform labor law for the benefit of labor itself have largely failed since the 1935 NLRA passage, unions and their allies need a new strategy. That starts with changing the frame of the debate—returning to rights-based legal strategies and challenging the unequal restrictions on free speech for what they are: unconstitutional.

The rights of working people to unite, protest, boycott unfair businesses, and demand change in all areas of business are fundamentally rooted in the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction amendments. Where labor law restricts these rights, either through statute or judicial fiat, it should be resisted and challenged as such.

Affirming free speech rights won’t just help workers or unions; it will benefit all Americans. The decline of union participation has resulted in stunning income inequality, wage stagnation, and widespread gaps in basic health, retirement, and family leave benefits, among other perverse outcomes. Stronger worker protections and a more robust labor movement is one sure-fire way to create a more prosperous and inclusive economy.

When the government can dictate to workers what they can or cannot write on a flyer, a picket sign or a tweet; where and when they can march; even what they may demand at the bargaining table, something has gone very wrong. We don’t just shift power to large corporations at the expense of struggling families; we violate a bedrock ideal of this country.

Unions have been on the defensive for so long it can be easy to accept the rigged rules of the system as a given, as immune to change—but they are not. They remain bound by the Constitution, like all else. It’s time to make sure that’s the case in practice.

[This article originally appeared at The American Prospect.]